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challenge that has been sounded in Vietnam and in Zanzibar, in the Congo and the Dominican Republic, in Venezuela and in Laos. Our task has become, first, to suppress insurgency where it has broken out, and then, over the longer term, to sustain and to build up the free societies of the world, so that the vulnerabilities and the inequities which give the Communists their openings no longer exist. The challenge, in short, is whether we can contain the erosive forces of insurgency as well as we have deterred the holocaust of general nuclear war.

Let me review first the more conventional threat, the military power of the Soviet Union.

It is obvious to us that the Soviets are pursuing a dynamic and sophisticated military program, directed toward developing better quality as well as quantity. In my opinion we must allow for the possibility that the ^{Soviet military research and development effort} program we are observing might achieve a breakthrough of some sort which could redress the present balance of power.


We find that new and improved intercontinental missiles are being developed, and deployed in new patterns which decrease their vulnerability. Anti-aircraft defenses are being strengthened. The development and deployment of antiballistic missile systems

State Dept. review completed

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SOVIET ICBM DEPLOYMENT



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obviously have a high priority. New and improved submarines are appearing, increasingly capable of long-range operations.

Few if any of the programs appear to be on a crash basis, but they do reflect an insistent Soviet determination to achieve advances in military power which are meant to assure the national security and international strategic power of the Soviet Union.

The principal strategic threat of the Soviet Union consists of the ballistic missiles of the Strategic Rocket Force, 100,000 ^{or more} ~~picked~~ men under the command of Marshal Krylov.

The magnitude of this strategic threat has remained constant for two years now, at about 220 operational ICBM launchers. About one third of these are in hardened silos, grouped in threes. The rest are on pairs of soft pads.

(MAP, ICBM COMPLEXES)

These launchers are ranged all across the Soviet Union, in 18 major launch complexes which first became operational in 1962.

Most of them are equipped with the second-generation SS-7 ICBM, a two-stage, liquid-fueled

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missile [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
(PHOTO, SS-8)

A few of them have the second-generation SS-8, shown in this picture, which was paraded in Moscow last November. A few launchers still have the original Soviet ICBM, the SS-6, which we believe now is used mainly as a booster for satellite launchings.

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This in itself is a formidable threat--a *force* *with* [REDACTED] *which would be* *to maintain targets of the Sov leaders decided to cancel* directed at American cities in the initial strike-- *an* but it is only part of the story.

We have considerable evidence that the Soviets are not only well advanced in the testing of third-generation ICBM's but are hard at work on a new deployment pattern featuring widely dispersed and well-hardened single silos, something like our MINUTEMAN launchers. There are apparently at least 300 of these new silos under construction, and the first of them are probably about ready for operational status. In other words, by the end of 1967 the number of operational launchers will be more than doubled.

Khrushchev once made a statement which filtered back to us about a Soviet officer named Penkovsky who had been sentenced to death for

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
espionage. Khrushchev said that Penkovsky had given us the location of all Soviet missile sites, so that they had to be re-located at a cost of 50 billion rubles.

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[redacted] the Khrushchev version made a good cover story for this very expensive program of expanding the Soviet Rocket Forces. (Repeat MAP, ICBM COMPLEXES)

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


~~In order to remedy this,~~ the Soviets over the past two years started ~~these~~ 300 new hardened silos, some of them forming seven new complexes along a line generally south of the original missile bases.

We believe these silos are designed for the SS-9 and SS-11, two ICBMs of a third generation which have been successfully fired over the extended range from the test center at Tyuratam into the mid-Pacific.

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
(PHOTO, SAVAGE)

The Soviets on the 20th anniversary of VE Day paraded some new weapons through Red Square. The most interesting one, shown in this photograph, was one they identified as a three-stage ICBM with solid propellant. Our experts conclude that a number of the weapons displayed--including this one--are still in the research and development stage, and we have no evidence that the Soviets have ever tested an ICBM with solid fuel. Their progress in solid propellants is considerably behind ours, but they have solid-fuel weapons for tactical ranges, and have just begun testing a new solid-fuel missile of medium or intermediate range. They are clearly capable of casting the large rocket motors which would give their ICBM force the benefits of solid propellants --quick reaction time and longer storage life.

To summarize the ICBM threat, then, the USSR not only has some 220 operational launchers and a reliable missile for them, but is developing and deploying new missiles in a major program to increase both the numbers and the survivability of its strategic missile force.

The Soviet Union also poses a very real threat

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to all of Western Europe with its missiles of intermediate and medium range, *as well as 100 T ground*

These are the missiles which were to have gone

25X1B into Cuba in 1962, [REDACTED]

25X1B [REDACTED]

(MAP, MRBM/IRBM coverage)

There are ^{nearly} ~~more than~~ 750 of these launchers, all of them inside the borders of the Soviet Union, and about 90 percent of them in the western USSR.

In an initial strike, they could deliver a devastating thermonuclear
~~They can deliver a thermonuclear~~ [REDACTED]

25X1B

^{attack}
[REDACTED] on targets in Europe and the Middle East.


25X1B

The Soviet Union also has more than 400 submarines. About 95 of them carry missiles and thus contribute to the strategic threat. There are nearly 50 which are nuclear-powered.

(PHOTOS, SELECTED SUBMARINES)

There are three or four of them, of the H-TWO class, which can launch a 700-mile ballistic missile while submerged. All of the others, however, must surface to launch. The bulk of them carry from four to eight cruise missiles with ranges up to 450 miles, ^{designed primarily for use against ships.} The G and H classes fire three ballistic missiles with a 350-mile range.

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SELECTED SOVIET MISSILE SUBMARINES



H II-CLASS


**probably equipped for underwater launch*



G-CLASS



E II-CLASS



J-CLASS

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Finally there is Soviet Long Range aviation, which has about 200 heavy bombers and more than 800 medium bombers. We estimate that this manned bomber force will decrease, but that at present it could still put about 100 heavy bombers over the United States on two-way missions, and up to 150 mediums over Greenland, Canada, Alaska, and the extreme northwestern United States.

The ground forces of the Soviet Union have ~~about 120 to 140~~ ^{about 130 to 150} line divisions, of which ~~about~~ ⁵⁰⁻⁷⁵ half are at or near effective combat strength.

Historically, the Russian forces have had little capability for substantial operations at any great distance from the homeland, but recently we have noted increasing emphasis on the development of highly mobile forces. ^{small naval infantry force} A ~~marine~~ corps was re-established in 1963. It has units in the Black Sea, Baltic, and Pacific Fleets. The seven Soviet airborne divisions maintain an intensive training schedule, and are receiving new equipment and an airlift of greater capacity and range.

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The Soviet Union is also improving the armed forces of the European satellites, equipping them with tactical ballistic missiles and the latest supersonic tactical fighter aircraft. About 40 of the 62 satellite divisions are now considered combat-ready, and one-third of these are armored divisions.

I said earlier that the Soviet strategic threat is held in check by our own superior offensive power. It is not my province to go into detail on the armaments of the United States, but I think I can safely quote Secretary McNamara's general summary that we have--and will have for the foreseeable future--an advantage of at least two-and-a-half to one, or three to one *in all* ~~the various categories of~~ strategic offensive weapons. We have an offense which we firmly believe can survive an initial attack and still strike back at the ^{remaining} Soviet Union with sufficient


devastation to destroy the Soviet strategic offense,

*though the Sov's own protected retaliatory
bases will grow rapidly.*

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USSR surface-to-air missile deployment



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This brings us to the Soviet defense against strategic attack--the one place where a major breakthrough in research and development could have a major impact on the present balance of forces.

Defense against strategic attack has a high priority in Soviet military planning. Soviet tradition, plus the threat posed by Western retaliatory powers, has resulted in Soviet allocation of about ¹⁵~~20~~ percent of ~~the~~ total military ^{expenditures} ~~budget~~ to strategic defense.

This has bought the USSR a good defense against manned bombers penetrating the Soviet Union at medium and high altitudes--which was the main threat of the 1950s.

Soviet antiaircraft defenses ^{are} ~~have~~ not, however, proved dependable against the sophisticated attack techniques which have developed in recent years, and the Soviets are attempting to improve these defenses. (MAP, SA-2 sites)

The current Soviet air defense system has an impressive quantity and variety of weapons deployed in depth, including about 1,200 surface-to-air missile sites shown on this map. The SA-2, the SAM system which was deployed to Cuba and is now in use in North Vietnam, is the mainstay of the missile defenses.

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(PHOTO, SA-2 SITE) *(Vu-graph in color)*

This is a photograph of an SA-2 site in Cuba, taken from an aircraft flying at about 500 feet. The SA-2 has not proven particularly effective in Vietnam. A recent box-score--in May--showed that a total of 285 missiles fired at our aircraft had destroyed 14 planes for sure, and probably another four which did not return. Conventional antiaircraft fire has accounted for more than 85 percent of the aircraft we have lost to hostile action.


The poor record of the SA-2 in Vietnam
~~This~~ is due in part to successful electronic warning devices and evasive tactics by our pilots, as is shown by the fact that the SA-2 system has been relatively more effective against the unpiloted photographic drones we send over North Vietnam. The SA-2 also has an inherently limited capability against aircraft at low altitudes, however, and in the USSR, to remedy this, the SA-2 is complemented by about 100 sites for the SA-3, designed for low-altitude work, *and in some places by anti-aircraft artillery.*
~~Backing up~~ *In addition to* the surface-to-air missile sites, there are several thousand jet fighters in Soviet Air Defense, with an extensive ground radar and control network. Nearly half of the force is equipped for all-weather operations, and the aircraft can carry air-to-air missiles.

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
SOVIET MISSILES

9 MAY PARADE, 1965

MOSCOW, USSR



GRIFFON



GALOSH

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For more than eight years now, we have been watching intensive Soviet efforts directed toward the development of an antiballistic missile capability. There is a ^{defensive systems} research and development center at Sary Shagan, in central USSR on Lake Balkhash, which covers 8,500 square miles and employs some 40,000 people.

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25X1D

The initial deployment of an anti-missile system is apparently under way at Moscow, where very large electronic installations have been seen under construction.

(PHOTO, GALOSH)

The missile for this system ^{is probably} ~~may be~~ this weapon, concealed in its cannister, which the Soviets have paraded in Red Square. Soviet television last year showed what it claimed were films of the launching of this missile and its interception of an attacking missile.

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
While the Soviets are apparently undertaking the expensive task of defending at least Moscow from ballistic attack, ^{we believe} they are also strengthening their defenses against our latest high-performance aircraft and air-launched cruise missiles of the stand-off systems like HOUND DOG. We now know that the Soviets are in the process of building a new ~~system of long range surface-to-air missile sites,~~ ¹²⁰⁰ forming a defensive barrier from the Baltic Sea coast across the area north of Moscow. Reports indicate that installations of this type may be under construction to guard the industrial complex in the Ural Mountains. The evidence we have so far ^{is probably a new, system, whose} indicates that this long-range SAM deployment may ^{be intended to provide improved defense} ~~amount to 250 to 350 launching positions.~~ ^{in depth for critical target areas.} In short, we see ample evidence that the Soviets are engaged in a costly and vigorous effort to protect their major urban and industrial areas from all forms of strategic attack.

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US AND USSR: ANNUAL RATE OF GROWTH IN GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, 1956-1965

(FIGURES IN PER CENT)

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It is, of course, impossible to assess the military posture of a nation purely in terms of hardware, without taking into account the condition of that country's economy and politics, and the thrust of the policies which the military establishment is supposed to serve. I find, however, that we could easily get into the kind of a presentation which has taken a full day or more with congressional committees, so I propose to limit the rest of my discussion of the Soviet Union to a precis of those factors which have a direct impact on the Soviet capability for attacking the free world.

The Soviet economy continues to grow, but in recent years there has been a general slowdown in the rate of growth. (CHART, US and Soviet Annual GNP growth rates)


Since 1958, the Soviet Gross National Product has been about half that of the United States.

In the late 1950s, it was growing at an average rate of about seven percent per year, and the Soviets were talking about target dates for overtaking the United States economy.

COMPOSITION OF SOVIET MILITARY EXPENDITURES 1955-65

BILLION
1955
RUBLES

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(information will be made)

For the early 1960s, however, the Soviet growth rate works out to about five percent a year. In 1963, the virtual disaster in agriculture held growth below two percent. The apparently healthy 7.6 percent shown in 1964 actually reflects only the recovery from the dismal 1963 performance.

One of the reasons for this slowdown is the competition of defense spending for high-quality resources which are in short supply.

(CHART, Defense spending and portion devoted to exotics)

This chart on Soviet defense expenditures shows an increase of better than 20 percent since 1959 in terms of constant prices.

The Soviet economy habitually runs at full throttle. Whenever the Soviets allocate more investment, more critical materials, more skilled technicians and industrial plant to one sector, it has to be taken away from another.

The bottom segment of the chart reflects the more exotic defense expenditures--R&D, space, nuclear weapons, missile systems, and electronics. You can see that the rise in total defense spending is made up almost entirely of the increase--amounting to about 60 percent since 1959--in

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these items, which require the best and the scarcest inputs. These are the very inputs which would be needed to modernize the civilian economy. There aren't enough of them to go around, and there won't be for a number of years.

Another reason for the reduced rate of growth of GNP in the 1960s is that the Soviets have not been able to maintain their previous rate of increase in investment for new productive capacity.

Still another major difficulty of the Soviet economy, of course, is the slow growth--punctuated by occasional dismal years like 1963--of agricultural output. This exerts a drag on the whole economy.

Since the ouster of Khrushchev, the new Soviet leadership has announced that it intends to do something about this perennial stepchild of the economy, including a planned doubling of investment for the 1966 to 1970 period compared to the preceding five years. We have doubts, however, that the existing agricultural institutions and policies are suitable for optimum use of such new resources. We look for only a slow improvement, over the long run, in Soviet agricultural output and production methods.

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As for the over-all Soviet Gross National Product, the outlook is that the growth rate is not going to return to the bouncing seven percent of the 1950s. It is doubtful that it will greatly exceed the poor performance of the past several years if--as we expect--there is some increase in the level of defense spending over the next five years.

The new Soviet five-year plan makes a number of promises--to get agriculture moving, to modernize industry, to improve consumer welfare, and to strengthen defense. Whatever the difficulties of the Soviet economy, we think that the first demand on its resources will be to provide whatever is considered necessary for the Soviet military challenge to the Free World. We also believe that whatever else may happen, the economy will continue to meet and cover this first priority.

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The men who took over from Khrushchev in October of 1965 have been conspicuously sober and cautious in their approach to domestic problems and in their conduct of foreign policy. This was confirmed again at the recent party congress in Moscow which, for all its advance billing, turned out to be one of the most soporific events in the annals of Communism.

Moscow, in fact, has provided a report that during the congress the Politburo, having been tipped that there was an American spy among the delegates, sent the security chief, Semichastny, to find him. Semichastny, so the story goes, gazed at the drowsy delegates for a moment, and then walked directly up to the spy in the center of the audience and arrested him. When the other leaders asked how he had managed this feat, Semichastny answered: "It was easy because I have studied Lenin. Lenin taught us that the enemy never sleeps."

To a very large degree, rule-by-committee is the order of the day in the Kremlin today. More often than not, rule-by-committee leads to the lowest common denominator, and thus to a certain lack of boldness. Furthermore, these leaders are products of an enormously ponderous and plodding bureaucratic establishment.

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(Khrushchev, of course, came from the same environment, and he was anything but colorless, but it is fair to say that he was dethroned for the very reason that his style of leadership and his manner of making policy offended the sensibilities of the establishment. Khrushchev's successors are much closer to the Soviet bureaucratic norm, and come by their drabness naturally. In mid-May, when Premier Kosygin was visiting Egypt, one of the Soviet officials in his party was heard to refer to him as "our chief accountant," which is not a bad thumbnail description.)

For all this, there is a large element of calculation behind this appearance of conservatism and preservation of the status quo. What this has meant has been a re-ordering of priorities. At home, the chief objective is to stir the Soviet economy out of its lethargy in both the industrial and agricultural sectors. Abroad, the main goal is to reduce the disarray in the ranks of international Communism. Moscow has reckoned that by tackling this problem calmly and quietly, without the feverishness and the outbursts of temperament which were so much a part of Khrushchev's style, it could bring about a closing of Communist ranks--excepting, of course, the Chinese and their small coterie of sympathizers.

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It is quite evident that the present Kremlin leaders are not the kind of men who intend to engage Soviet prestige in every brushfire war which breaks out around the world. On the contrary, they seem to have a fairly realistic appreciation of the intricacy of the world's problems, and of the limitations which Moscow faces in trying to advance its national interests under such circumstances.

As a result, the USSR, for the time being at least, is trying to avoid the mistakes of the past by concentrating on areas where it believes that genuine opportunities exist. This is particularly true in the underdeveloped world, where the Russians have adopted a more selective approach.

The Russians have made rather substantial progress in improving their position in the Middle East and South Asia. Egypt remains the keystone of Soviet policy in the Middle East, and there have been significant new military aid agreements with Iraq and Syria. Moscow also, however, has been making a serious effort to exploit the growing dissatisfaction of Iran and Turkey with what the West has been doing to meet the requests of these countries. Kosygin will soon be paying a visit to Turkey in a further attempt to loosen the ties of Ankara with both NATO and CENTO.

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Moscow's efforts in the so-called "third world," however, have been overshadowed by Soviet preoccupation with the problems of the Communist world.

In Eastern Europe, for instance, it has been evident for several years now that that there is a rugged strain of self-interested nationalism at work among the leaders of the satellite regimes. What is good for Moscow, it seems, is no longer necessarily good for the whole Communist bloc, and we see no reason to quarrel with the recent news stories that the Rumanians have gone so far as to challenge the need for Soviet troops in Eastern Europe. Any day now, the Russians may announce that they have been the first to discover that there can be friction within an alliance.

The Eastern European satellites probably would have become restive and self-assertive even without the Sino-Soviet dispute, but the most sensitive problems of international Communist at present focus on Peking. Communist parties all over the world have found themselves forced to choose sides, and a number of them have split into two opposing parties.

Moscow decided that it doesn't pay to carry on a verbal slugging match with the Chinese, and at present this strategy appears to have paid off.

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The Kremlin's tactics, together with a series of disastrous setbacks to Chinese foreign policy, have left Peking virtually isolated in the Communist world. Whatever course the Communist world congresses may take, however, Vietnam remains a key issue in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and the outcome may well prove decisive for both Moscow and Peking. Soviet involvement in the Vietnam conflict has clearly reflected Moscow's awareness of the risk of confrontation with the United States, yet Moscow can hardly afford to let Peking accuse the Soviets of faintheartedness. Peking, on the other hand, is determined that the Vietnam war will not end short of a Communist victory, but you can measure the bitterness of the Sino-Soviet dispute by the lengths to which Peking went to obstruct the transit of Soviet military aid across China.

The new Soviet style then, is more quiet and more cautious than that of Stalin or of Khrushchev, and the Soviet leaders keep telling us that it is only the war in Vietnam that prevents an improvement in bilateral US-Soviet relations, and East-West accommodations on outstanding issues. Let me stress, however, that the Soviets have changed their style but not their goal. They are still intent on enhancing their status as a world power and on advancing their national interests at our expense.

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For Moscow, the paramount issues are those problems which have been left unresolved since the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945. Soviet leaders have given every indication that they hope to return the focus of US attention to the question of Europe, and particularly the crucial problem of Germany. In the months and years ahead, I think we can look for a concerted drive by the Soviet Union to take advantage of any and all divisive tendencies on the West European scene--in order to achieve the political isolation of Germany.

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Communist China, for both nationalistic and ideological reasons, considers the United States its primary enemy.

Mao is reported to have told Kosygin last year that the Soviet line of "peaceful coexistence" benefits only the imperialists, and that China will continue to base its policy on the assumption that another world war in 10 to 15 years is unavoidable. Khrushchev once implied that he felt Peking would almost welcome a general thermonuclear war, because the Chinese had little industrial capacity to lose, and had a large enough population so that they could absorb the heavy casualties and emerge with relatively greater manpower. (X)

Peking in a way presents the paradox of a nation which has armed forces of World War II vintage, which has little military capability at any substantial distance from its own borders, but which aggressively pursues a goal of world revolution, challenges both the Soviet Union and the United States, and has achieved a nuclear capability in an economy which still relies more on primitive manpower than on machinery. (X)

China is just beginning to equip itself with the elements essential to operation as a major world power, but it pursues an assertive and uncompromising foreign

policy that reaches as far afield as Latin America and Africa. Peking has chosen the underdeveloped world as its most advantageous arena for competition. The Chinese intend not only to erode US strength, but to displace Soviet influence in these areas, in order to establish themselves as the champions and teachers of the underdeveloped nations.

In Asia, the Chinese oppose us because we are white, because we are capitalists, and because we are there. We are not only the chief devil in the Marxist demonology of the Communists; we are also, in their eyes, the principal representatives of the white "foreign devils" who humiliated imperial China--and today's Chinese leaders have as strong a sense of history as they do of Marx and Lenin.

World War II brought effective US power westward from Pearl Harbor to the shores of mainland China and into Southeast Asia, the traditional satellite belt of Imperial China as well as Mao Tse-tung and Company. At present, the Chinese can pose no effective threat to the United States itself, but they can get at us on the Western side of the Pacific, and they are determined to drive us out of what they consider their rightful sphere of domination.

Phase One in the Chinese plan probably calls for eliminating our presence in Southeast Asia and pushing us into the sea. This does not necessarily involve hordes of Chinese infantrymen pouring down to Singapore and across Thailand and Burma. What they probably have in mind is a series of political and military actions by proxy, as in Vietnam, which would bring an end to our influence and our access to the area, and transform it into a Chinese satellite preserve. (X)

They are already laying the groundwork for Phase Two, to roll back Western influence from the periphery of China. This would extend Chinese domination to the off-shore island empires--not Quemoy and the Matsus, in this context, but Japan, Taiwan, Indonesia, and even the Philippines. The ultimate objective would be to bring about Japan's World War II project of a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere," but with Peking rather than Tokyo calling the tune. Some of these targets are too large, and too far from mainland China, to be subjugated by Chinese military force in the foreseeable future. (X)

Peking probably hopes, however, that it can at least isolate them from Western support, keep them disorganized and cowed by the Chinese threat, and thus amenable to dictation from Peking.

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Elsewhere, the Chinese are already challenging the United States and the Soviet Union anywhere in the under-developed world--for instance, in Albania, in Tanzania, in Pakistan, in Syria, and among the Communist parties of the Western hemisphere. They use diplomacy, economic aid, on a limited scale, ideology, subversion, and terrorism. Above all, they cash in on chaos wherever they can find it, and they seek to create it where conditions are ripe.

The Chinese do their best to fan conflicts which already exist--for example, the tensions between India and Pakistan. They exploit ignorance, racial prejudices, and economic misery wherever they find them. In this way, they are capable of stirring up major disorders and achieving influence out of all proportion to the risks they take, or the resources they need to expend.

Meanwhile, they are working feverishly to build their effective military strength, so that they will be able to back up with muscle what is now largely mischief, manipulation, and bluff.

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This medium bomber force, which is composed of two TU-16 (Badger) jet aircraft and a dozen or so TP-4 (Bull) piston aircraft, constitutes Communist China's current nuclear delivery force.

We might take a quick look at the Chinese military establishment. They have an army of about two and a half million men, making up 106 infantry divisions backed up by armor, artillery, and other service and support units. It is essentially a sub-standard World War II army, severely limited in firepower and mobility.

Peking has been unable to produce sufficient quantities of the heavier types of war equipment, particularly armor and heavy artillery.

Peking's air force, originally Soviet-equipped, 90 piston light bombers, and a small force of medium bombers.
has about 2,000 jet fighters and 250 light jet bombers, *Most of*

It is the world's fourth largest air force, but it suffers from attrition and from inadequate training activities.

Most of the fighters are the older MIG-15 and MIG-17, comparable to our F-84s and F-86s. There are possibly 300 MIG-19s, which are now being produced in China, and about 35 MIG-21s. *Most of* the bombers are Soviet-built IL-28 BEAGLE jet light bombers, with a maximum combat radius of about 670 miles, and maximum bomb load of 6,600 pounds.

Peking's navy is the weakest element of its armed forces, despite the possession of the world's fourth largest submarine fleet. It is primarily a coastal defense force, but we see indications that the fleet of some 35 submarines, mainly conventional torpedo attack

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boats of the Soviet W class, are beginning to work on a capability for out-of-area operations.

Except for the massive infantry manpower, this is not an imposing array of force by global standards, and the Chinese Communists are well aware of their deficiencies.


Their armed forces were originally created with Soviet help, Soviet advice, and Soviet equipment. In mid-1960, the Soviet assistance came to an end. The next four years were years of patching, repairing, or using up the military technology and hardware which had already been obtained from the Soviet Union.

Over the past two years, however, Communist China has entered a new phase of military development ^{*based on previously supplied Soviet technology, but*} ~~was~~ far as we can see, ^{*only minimal*} ~~entirely without~~ Soviet help.

The Chinese have built and detonated three nuclear devices, and are making progress in the development of both surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missile systems. They have launched ~~new~~ submarines, begun the serial production of ^{*relatively*} ~~advanced~~ fighter aircraft, and may be about to begin the production of jet ^{*fighter*} ~~bombers~~.

~~SECRET~~

25X1B



We estimate that it will take another year or two, and more nuclear tests, for the Chinese to package their nuclear device into a weapon which can either be carried by the IL-28 bombers, or be fitted to a missile warhead--and we also estimate that an operational surface-to-surface missile system is two to three years in the future, *perhaps as late as 1970.*

The Chinese are ^{*may be*} ~~probably~~ working on a medium-range ballistic missile with a range of about 1,000 miles.

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China is also working on a surface-to-air missile, perhaps a modification of the SA-2.

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